Introduction
This article is primarily concerned in a power struggle within Turkey for over the The argument I put forward in this essay runs as follows: a) Initial consideration for laicist policies and legislation of the republican decision making elite were to alter not only the supra-structure of Turkey towards a modern/Western body as their predecessors in the late Ottoman times, but also to transform the whole Turkish society into a modern one. Traditional belief appeared there as a threat for this seemingly ambitious project of modernity. Therefore, the 1 I use the term laicists for ones that prefer the state's control of religion as opposed to secularism which implies the separation of state and religion. As Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh point out, "The longstanding French policy of laicité exemplifies … desire to restrict, if not eliminate, clerical and religious influence, over the state. The French Parliament's ban in 2004 of conspicuous religious clothing and insignia in public schools -aimed at the wearing of Muslim headscarves-illustrates this suspicion of religion and is an attempt to avert the growth and influence of an incipient Muslim fundamentalism in that nation. The modern Islamic society of Turkey is similarly an example of a state founded on strongly secular principles where restrictions on individual religious liberty have been introduced to prevent pressure being exerted by the predominant religious group" (Ahdar & Leigh, 2005: 73) . For a comprehensive argumentation on the terms laic and secular, and their derivatives, see Davison, 2003 . I totally agree with Davison in his arguments, thus I prefer to use the term 'laicist' for republican state practice in Turkey. Furthermore, laiklik (laicité) is the concept that is preferred by the Republican decision-making elite of turkey in all legislations and other legal regulations. 2 Islamists are typically defined as those who advocate the shari'a (Islamic law derived from the Qur'an) as basis for a system of government. In order to be consistent, an Islamist has to prefer the shari'a. Thus the powers of the Presidency of Religious Affairs were considerably reduced.
Furthermore, article 7 of the Act stated that mosques and prayer rooms would be classified according to 'real needs', and duties that could be combined would be specified in order to determine new positions, so that the personnel were also reduced. Despite all these changes, the legal regulation was passed in the Assembly without any objection. The annulment of article 5 of the Act no. 429, which was inconsistent with the said law, was clearly stated by the Grand National Assembly decision on 4 January 1932. The difference in attitudes observed in these proceedings compared to previous related laws is especially interesting. Previous debates were generally just votings on the proposed regulations; whereas now serious debates were held. Also, the statement that took place in the preamble of the Act no. 5634 as, 'the necessity and need reflected by continuous requests by members in party congresses' was yet another indication of the same change in climate that was decidedly more sensitive to religious issues. By this legislation, the name 'Reislik' was changed to the name 'Başkanlık' which reflected a change in the use of the Turkish language (Reis is the Ottoman equivalent of 'president', whereas 'başkan' is modern Turkish) and several new units were created within the organization. Moreover, the management of mosques and prayer rooms and mosque personnel which had been transferred to the Presidency General for Foundations by the 1931 Budget Act was given back to the The absence of a clergy in Islam -unlike Christianity with its church system-is one of the most important facts legitimizing the state's intervention in religion categorizing it as a public service. Considering that public services can be defined as an activity managed by public legal entities or by private entities supervised by the state for the purpose of meeting a shared and general need which has acquired a certain importance for the people, the state's involvement in religious affairs is generally accepted in this context as something that does not conflict with secularist principles. An assessment of the duties of the Diyanet in this context reveals that duties such as 'the management of places of prayer' and 'providing correct publications of the Koran' are indeed public services fulfilling a collective need.
However, the state makes use of the Diyanet as an administrative tool to propagate official ideology regarding Islam while fulfilling duties like "enlightening society about religion" and "religious education". An interesting point here is the differing policies of administrations over time from being strictly positivistic to somewhat religious.
Thus, it cannot be claimed that after the annulment of Act No. 1982 came into effect, Act No. 633 would come into effect. In short, Diyanet can be defined as a legal oddity, which continues to exist as a very powerful administrative unit despite its lack of a technically legal basis.
The principle of equality, construed and applied as 'equality in blessings and burden' by the Turkish Constitutional Court, requires that all persons eligible for a public service should be able to benefit from such service in a free and equitable manner. The first problem that arises when the subject of public service is religion is that the state is focused on a single religion rather than on services including all religions in the territory. However as concerns administrative unit remains technically without proper regulations for over 35 years, let alone one concerning a very sensitive issue like religion that all interested parties seem to be totally obsessed with. I believe that a thorough survey on the legal mentality of the decision-making elite in Turkey would be very interesting and useful in trying to understand the politics in this country. 8 our present subject matter, this problem is relatively easy to deal with, because Islam is the religion of the majority of the people and services related to other religions are provided by the respective communities according to the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty. However, a problem emerges in services to be offered to different Muslim groups having different beliefs.
It has been observed that the religious belief promoted by the State is closer to the Sunnite tradition and that the Diyanet and its officers or spokespersons have sometimes tended to display hostility towards Alevi and Shiite citizens. A draft law prepared in 1963 for defining the organization and duties of the Diyanet proposed the establishment of a "Presidency of Religious Sects." This proposal, however, was criticized on the grounds that it could "pave the way for official separation" and was never implemented.
The Diyanet claims that Alevis and Sunnites are not subject to discrimination because, except for certain local customs and beliefs, there are no differences between these two sects regarding basic religious issues hence this indicates a denial of a separate 'Alevi' religious identity. The fact that Sunnites constitute the majority apparently appears to be justifiable to Turkish republican laic elite, as the state disregards other sects. The Diyanet pretending to be unaware of the religious belief of the Alevi population, and its building of mosques in Alevi villages, is a pressure exerted by the state to implant the Sunnite belief in this section of society.
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The existing legal structure provides a dual nature to the Diyanet. On one hand, religious life is being controlled by the secular state. This is assumed in so far as the Presidency is directed by managers loyal to the secular state. However, the extensive network of the Diyanet all over the country, which no other administrative body enjoys, is a great opportunity for all governments to perform power, regardless of their political positions. thus the Diyanet as an administrative organism may indirectly obtain power over the government.
However paradoxically, in this context, the state employs in Turkey the Diyanet against religion and its influence on the socio-political level.
A Story of the State, the Society and Religion in Turkey
After the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the state elite tried to secure the system they structured through a series of laicist legal regulations. Laicist reforms abolished the caliphate, established a state monopoly over education, disestablished the institution of the ulema (doctors of Islamic law), rejected Islamic law and adopted a modified version of the Swiss Civil Code, Latinized the alphabet, and, in 1928, struck out the sentence in the Constitution of 1924 which stated that the Turks were of Islamic faith (Zürcher, 1993 : 194) Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's policy on religion and state affairs was to remove religion from social realm and "to confine it to the conscience of people," and make it a set of beliefs that would not go beyond the personal lives of people. Thus the aim was to reduce religion to a matter of faith and prayer, and the principle of freedom of religion and conscience was to protect only individualised religion and prayers. Religion was to remain in the personal domain and to necessitate state intervention to the extent that it concerns and objectifies the social order.
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Kemalist nationalists preferred what seemed a risky path. Although it actually was not so, they declared that all the ties with the Islamist and the Ottoman past were cut off. They chose to join totally to a utopic 'universal civilization' believed to be represented in an idealized form by Europe. (Gülalp, 2003a: 35) However, while the Kemalists denied Islam as a civilization project, they continued to imagine the Turkish nation as Muslim "Turkish Republic" was designed to be a strictly temporal state. Mustafa Kemal stated this clearly: "We get our inspirations not from the heavens or invisible things but directly from life." (Atatürk, 1945: 389) The purpose in this period was to secularise not only the state and the 'political', but also society and the 'social'. In my opinion, this is the biggest difference between Republican and Ottoman modernizations.
.
13 11 Actually this was a political/legal enforcement of the "secularization thesis" (see Casanova 1994: 17-39) , and "privatization of religion" (see Luckmann: 1967) by adopting the right to individual belief, "a product of the only legitimate space (that was) allowed to Christianity by post-Enlightenment society (Asad 1993: 45.) Some time after the establishment of the republic, assuming the regime to be secured, a tendency appeared to include Islam in the legitimating ideology of the political power (Sakallıoglu, 1996) . Meanwhile two 'very different conceptions of life' (Howe, 2000: 243) formatted in Turkey: on one side is a secular life while, on the other, is a religious life. In Metin Heper, a political scientist academician,'s words, "those in the secularist camp are troubled by the 'fact' that a significant part of the population in Turkey does not think the way they do, and 12 "Turkey is often defined as a predominantly Muslim country; Islamists especially delight in repeating at every opportunity that 99% of Turkish people are Muslim. But this is mostly a definition given to them by the secular state. Unless declared otherwise, every child born in Turkey is registered as Muslim and this is clearly indicated in every person's government-issued identity card. Moreover, there is a limit to the choice of religions that could legally be stated in a person's identity card -only those religions officially recognised by the state are acceptable, identifying oneself as 'atheist' or even just leaving that box blank is not. 'Muslim' is evidently a social identity conferred upon the Turkish people by the 'secular' state". (Gülalp, 2003b: 394) 13 In areas other than the national capital Ankara, and some metropolitans like Istanbul and Izmir, also the 'nation' shared this perception. Michael E. Meeker points out a curious strategy of the local elite in the town Of to take part in the sovereign power of the state system. Meeker characterizes the phenomena as a fusion of identities, and presents two brilliant terms to the literature as 'Kemalo-Islamism' and 'Libero-Islamism' (Meeker, 2002: 51-54). are not convinced by the assurances of those in the Islamist camp that if the latter capture power they will respect the secularists' life styles. Consequently, the secularists are hostile to virtually anything that smacks of Islam. In turn, those in the Islamist camp have lost all hope that the secularists will eventually accept them into their fold, and, as a result, have adopted an equally uncompromising attitude" (Heper, 2001) .
A new middle class became visible after the 1980's 14 , accepting the ethical standards and cultural values of the traditional order but also adopted the rational business rules and the profit motive of the capitalist market system. 15 Actually, as the late Ernest Gellner put it, "Of the Western monotheisms, Islam is the most Protestant. That is, … Islam … has certain appropriate 'Protestant' features: rule orientation, strict Unitarianism, a kind of completeness, the stress on the doctrine, and the finality of doctrine. Now, if this is a correct sketch of Islam, and if the Weberian thesis is correct …", (Gellner, 1997: 234) Technique, Civilization, Alienation) by Ismet Ozel that was published first in 1978, as an initiator of such a line of criticism (Çakır, 1990: 252-253) . This new literature was not only popular in Islamic wing, but also ignited the widespread debate of the 80's and 90's among the Turkish intelligentsia about the conduct to be taken in issues of modernity.
, and his followers control a complex web of businesses and significant broadcast and print media in Turkey and in Central Asia. (Eickelman, 2002:123-127) .
In February 1997, the mayor of Sincan, a town on the outskirts of Ankara, organised "Turkey's secularist establishment, they believe will respect moderate religiosity in a proIslamic party if it refrains from employing a rhetorical discourse and if it maintains a transparent political agenda" (Cizre & Çınar, 2003: 327) . As Keyman and İçduygu analyze, the AKP's economic program is a communitarian-liberal synthesis operating on the basis of three principles which actually are requirements of IMF:
b) a regulated free market which is not destructive and corrupted, but enriching contributing to economic development and socially just. 18 In addition to having an Islamist movement rooted politically to be represented in the Parliament by Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP, National Salvation Party) of Necmettin Erbakan, whose tradition is embodied in the ruling AKP, Turkey also has a number of active small and medium-sized radical Islamist groups. For a recent report published in September 2007 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on the "reemergence of Hizbullah in Turkey" see Çakır, 2007. 19 In an article Erdoğan is quoted as saying "Let me be quite open and clearin stating a fact -we don't find it appropriate to mix religion and politics (…). We are not Muslim democrats, we are conservative democrats. Some in the west portray us as (Muslim democrats) but our Notion of conservative democracy is to atytach ourselves to the customsand the traditions and the values of our society, which is based on the family. This is a democratic issue, not a religious one. (Vincent Boland, "Eastern Premise" Financial Times, 3 December 2004.) c) social justice, which is to be established both in terms of the distribution of wealth and welfare services and with respect to the domain of recognition in which social segments will not be discriminated in terms of their different cultural practices. (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 5-6) 20 It is evident that the Kemalist model eroded. I personally feel that it would indeed be an ingratitude to the republican founding elite should we only hold them guilty for their deeds and their consequences, even though I think that especially it was extremely harsh, to say the least, to sever a culture by a means of changing and implicitly banning a script (the outcome unfortunately happened apparently to be an amnesiac, or at least, an aphasic society in terms of intellect). It also seems acceptable to me to come to a conclusion that all groups in Turkey somewhat benefited from the change created by the late Ottoman and early republican decision-making elite. Thus, it seems best to try to find some grounds of communication for Kahraman, 2007: 118-138. This is an expression of the social change that Turkey has been experiencing especially within the last decade. Apparently this is a period of crisis which is an inevitable phase of modernity, as a product of decreasing space between the center and the periphery. In my opinion, currently this crisis has been left behind to a great extent; and a phase of integration has been started. However this integration is not built on an assimilation mechanism; but rather as a pluralistic texture of varying personal and communal interests, attitudes, expectations, and actions. Although it may seem to be paradoxical, actually as of internal dynamics, it has been conflicts that have nurtured this process of change. Social, cultural, and political encounters has made way for experiences involving interactions; and thus every field of experience has become a track of change. In terms of dynamics of change, what is significant among the actors is the altering perceptions of the others evolving from changes in self-perceptions.
Therefore in such a change, compromise stems out of a social intersection, rather than an ultimate political agreement. 22 It is interesting in this sense that a quite recent survey in Turkey reveals that a large group of laicists and Islamists are coming closer to each other in their views about democracy, freedoms, and rights. It is also interesting that the ones that are resisting change in each group, and the poles that have been experiencing "reverse alteration"
tend to be very similar in terms of mentality. (Bayramoğlu, 2006) 23
In order to overcome ossific issues, several further means may also be sought. For example, deliberative democracy provides opportunities when citizens or their representatives disagree morally. In order to fulfil a deliberate democracy, it is required that the parties to continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996: 1) . Another process of negotiation may be exemplified by a work run in an Islamic context. A current project carried under the working title, 'The Future of Shari'a' by Prof.
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law at Emory Law School, focuses on the struggle of Islamic societies to define themselves and positively relate to the local and global conditions under which they live 24 22 Nuray Mert, a prominent political analyst, claims that a social compromise may initially be achieved only if an awareness exists to live together. Consequent steps are mutual acceptance of social differences, an on-going social communication, and enabling minimum social, political, economic justice. (Mert, 1998: 182) . The fundamental concern of the project is how to ensure the institutional separation of Shari'a and the state, despite the organic and unavoidable connection between Islam and politics. The first part of this proposition sounds like 'secularism' as commonly understood today, but the second part indicates the opposite. This is a permanent paradox, which is part of the thesis, namely, that the relationship among religion, state, and society is the product of a constant and deeply contextual negotiation, rather than the subject of a fixed formula, whether a claim of total separation or total fusion of religion and the state. The project thesis proposes that the paradox of separation of Islam and the state while maintaining an organic relationship among Islam, politics and social interaction, can only be mediated through practice over time, rather than completely resolved through theoretical analysis. Insisting on 'a constant and deeply contextual negotiation, rather than the subject of a fixed formula' is evidently very similar to the basics of 'deliberate democracy', or any attempt alike that stems out from a need to communicate. 23 A report published by the European Union Institute for Security Studies in June 2007, that is before the general elections of July 2007, conclude that, "Turkey's ongoing crisis is multifaceted but essentially boils down to the fact that the TSK (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri/Turkish Armed Forces) does not want to allow the AKP to elect their Commander-in-Chief, i.e. the Turkish president." (Posch, 2007: 47) Now that Abdullah Gül, the candidate of AKP, has been elected as the president it seems that "just another bump on Turkey's road" to further democratization has been surpassed. 24 See http://people.law.emory.edu/~abduh46/#1
